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Abstract
This paper presents a model of litigation in the context of a labor contract.
The main objective of our analysis is to determine whether and under which
conditions it is eﬃcient that the judiciary arbiters a labor conﬂict and how
the judge’s decision should be made in order to be optimal. We embed this
idea by considering a relationship between an employer and his worker, in
which they can make (non contractible) relationship-speciﬁc investments. The
optimality here refers to the best investment incentives of the parties allowing
to maximize the generated surplus. We derive conclusions about the judge’s
behavior giving right investment incentives and determine how the division of
the surplus should vary depending on several economic and social parameters.
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1“There are some respectable arguments in favor of (some) employment protection. One in particular
is based on incomplete contracts. If workers sink some costs in the relation, say to spend some time
and money training for job speciﬁc skills, ﬁrms, once the cost is sunk, may have excessive bargaining
power. Firing costs may then reestablish the balance, and lead workers to invest the right amount
in the relation.”, Olivier Blanchard, Employment Protection and Unemployment, 1998.
1 Introduction
This paper proposes a contribution to the study of the “ex-ante” optimal design of an
economy’s institutional and legal environment. Globalization has led to an increased
interest in the relationship between the legal and institutional design of societies
and their respective economic performance (e.g., Botero et al., 2004; Caballero et
al., 2004; The World Bank Doing Business Report, 2006). Most of these studies
insist on the design of the legal and institutional framework as a way to improve
the eﬃciency of the ﬁrms’ organization (Deﬀains and Demougin, 2006). The paper
deals with legal proceedings governing labor relationships. More precisely, it focuses
on individual litigation in labor law and mainly the judicial process in case of breach
of a labor contract by the employer. The main question refers to the judge’s role
in such a context: is it important to have a coercive third party to solve a conﬂict
between an employer and an employee? Or is it better in an eﬃciency perspective to
limit the intervention of a third party? These questions are crucial but, surprisingly,
they did not receive much interest in the literature. The main reason is that labor
economics as well as industrial organization, when considering the regulation of
labor relationships, generally focus on the role of the legislator and not on the way
courts enforce labor law. This kind of discussion is typically the concern of the Law
and Economics approach, but labor law has never been seriously investigated by the
specialists of this approach.
The Employment Outlook report (1999) ranks OECD countries according to
their degree of labor protection. This degree is a function of the diﬃculty to dis-
miss, the legal procedures in case of layoﬀ, the amount of severance payments, etc.
European countries that are, traditionally, the most protective of labor are Italy,
Spain, Portugal, France and Germany.1 In these countries, legal procedures in case
of layoﬀ are generally complex, take a long time and therefore, appear to be vague
for contracting parties, specially for small ﬁrms.2 This is typically the case in France
1See The Employment Outlook report, 1999, table 2.5, for country speciﬁc overall employment
protection legislation (EPL) strictness in the late 1990s.
2In the paper, we will not distinguish between the terms “dismissal” and “layoﬀ”.
2where the enforcement of the labor code by courts seems quite complicated. But it
is also the case in other countries: Goerke et Pannenberg (2006) insist on the fact
that the German regulation of labor is frequently perceived as “indeﬁnite”, implying
a great scope for judicial decisions.
We propose to evaluate the eﬀect of labor law enforcement on the ﬁrm/worker
relationship, in which each party can make speciﬁc investments. Such investments
may be of a wide variety and manifold. For example, investments by the ﬁrm can be
in new productive technology (i.e., physical capital), while those by the worker, in
ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills and job training (i.e., human capital). We develop a simple two-
stage model to analyze this issue. In the ﬁrst stage, the parties independently and
non-cooperatively choose their respective levels of relationship-speciﬁc investments.
In the second stage, a negative industry shock may occur with some positive proba-
bility, inducing a breach of the contract which implies that the parties negotiate over
the severance pay requested by the worker (with the possibility to litigate in case
of disagreement). The main objective is to determine the judge’s optimal behavior
when ﬁxing the severance pay allowance if the parties go to trial. In other words, we
are looking for the judge’s decision that provides the parties with the best investment
incentives. Notice that the judge’s decision implies a “certain”division of the eco-
nomic surplus generated by each party’s investment. Using this simple framework,
we show that the mere presence of a judge in the background of negotiations may
entirely drive their outcome and prevent the partners from behaving opportunisti-
cally ex-post, thereby promoting eﬃcient (second-best) investments ex-ante. The
intuition underlying this idea is the following one. The size of the economic surplus
depends on the equilibrium investments made at the ﬁrst stage. The latter depend
on the equilibrium distribution of the surplus between the two parties determined at
the second stage, which, in turn, depends on the parties’ relative bargaining powers
that are in general inﬂuenced by their respective disagreement payoﬀs and hence
by the court’s behavior. In other words, the judge’s decision may have distributive
consequences inﬂuencing the parties’ respective bargaining powers and, hence, the
partition of the surplus. Finally, it matters for eﬃciency because it modiﬁes the
parties’ incentives to invest. Furthermore, we show that the judge should take into
account some economic, social, and institutional parameters which are central to
the determination of the optimal distribution of the surplus.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 displays some
related literature’s references. Section 3 lays down our model and studies the equi-
librium implications of the judge’s presence and potential behavior. Section 4 dis-
cusses our main results and concludes. For ease of exposition, all technical proofs
3are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Related Literature
For a few years, new questions related to labor law, the eﬃciency of the judicial
system and the role of judges in labor conﬂicts have arisen. On this latter point,
the judges’ decision criteria have been considered for a long time as a black box
in economics. Recently, some attemps to determine how judges make their deci-
sions have emerged through empirical studies on the judge’s behavior. Ichino et al.
(2003) show through an empirical analysis on Italian courts’ decisions that when a
ﬁring litigation goes to trial, not only the characteristics of the case but also the
local labor market conditions are taken into account in the courts’ decisions. More
speciﬁcally, they ﬁnd that higher unemployment would induce judges to tend to be
more favorable to workers (or symmetrically, less indulgent with ﬁrms), despite the
fact that more serious cases for misconduct may be brought to them. Thus, judges
would not be completely impartial but biased in their decisions by macroeconomic
conditions. Likewise, Marinescu (2005) asserts the idea that judges would maximize
the joint welfare of the ﬁrm and the dismissed worker, and tailor ﬁring costs to
both individual and local economic circumstances. Using UK employment tribunals
data, she ﬁnds notably that the higher the unemployment rate, the more likely the
unemployed dismissed worker is to win the case. These original studies highlight the
existence of a (more or less strong) deviation of the judges’ behavior from the law
and this might explain in part why some economists currently plead for a limitation
of the judges’ role in labor disputes.
Blanchard and Tirole (2003, 2004) challenge both the importance of the judi-
ciary and the role of the judge. They argue that in labor conﬂicts due to a layoﬀ,
the judge should not interfere in the decision of a ﬁrm to ﬁre a worker. Their ar-
gument is that if the employer is willing to bear the ﬁring costs, the judge’s role
should be simply to verify that the rules governing the ﬁring procedure have been
observed (i.e., that law has been correctly enforced and administrative formalities
respected). Thus, the judge should not be able to substitute himself to the judgment
of a manager, because the former has neither necessary information nor the proper
skills to make this kind of decision. In other words, the judge should be conﬁned
to pure legal questions and stay away from economic considerations. Following the
same idea, Cahuc and Kramarz (2004) imagine a new “unique labor contract” which
would allow to simplify the judge’s role: their suggestion is to make the employer
responsible for dismissals by establishing a “solidarity tax” due whenever ﬁring a
4worker. This procedure should enable the employer to make a ﬁring decision exclu-
sively on his own by taking into account the social cost of a dismissal that he would
have to bear. In this context, the question of the fairness of ﬁring (usually super-
vised, if need be, by a court) becomes irrelevant. As a result, the internalization of
the dismissal’s social cost would lower the judge’s role. These analyses have then in
common to recommend to restrict greatly this role. We do adopt a diﬀerent view
and argue that the mere presence of the judiciary may contribute to labor relations’
eﬃciency, having thus a fundamental role in labor relationships.
A growing number of studies show that judicial decisions may have some ex-
ante consequences in the context of work relations and possibly on labor conﬂicts.
This argument comes originally from Mnookin and Kornhauser (1979) who highlight
the fact that legal rules and courts’ decisions for adjudicating disputes aﬀect the pre-
trial bargaining process that occurs between divorcing parties. The parties would
use the legal framework provided by law when negotiating outside the court room
(i.e., “in the shadow of the law”). Applying this concept to labor conﬂicts, Goerke
and Pannenberg (2006) show that the shadow of employment protection rules has
an impact on the outcomes of dismissal conﬂicts in Germany. Both theoretically
and empirically, they ﬁnd that criteria deﬁned by law regarding the entitlement and
amount of severance payment aﬀect signiﬁcantly the magnitude and incidence of
severance pay amounts decided or bargained between parties. For example, they
show that an employee with personal characteristics such as greater tenure, more
extensive alimony duties or higher age is more likely to receive higher severance
payments. Malo (2000) models the determinants of severance pay for individual
dismissals in Spain and shows that the legal framework determines severance pay-
ment through an ex-post (i.e., after a negative shock) bargaining process between
the worker and the employer.
Still focusing on this idea, other analyses have been interested in the welfare
eﬀects of employment protection, which is deﬁned as the set of restrictions used to
secure labor use.3 Even if there is no unanimity about overall employment protec-
tion eﬀects (especially on unemployment rate), it is often argued that employment
protection legislation can encourage productivity enhancing investments through the
stimulation of training investments, reduction of turnover, etc. Belot et al. (2006)
study the opposite eﬀects of employment protection, which implies costs (such as
3According to Addison and Teixeira (2003), “employment protection would cover dismissals
protection [...], limitations on the use of ﬁxed-term and temporary work agency contracts [...],
the regulation of working hours [...] as well as additional labor standards as regulations on
parental/maternity leave, posted workers, health and safety, equality of treatment of atypical
workers, mandatory sick pay, worker representation rights, and minimum wages inter al.”
5ﬁring costs) for employers who want to make readjustements in their workforce, but
which also stimulates productivity enhancing investments from workers by protect-
ing them from being ﬁred. The authors build a model in which they put in balance
adjustment costs and productivity growth, recommending a trade-oﬀ between them.
The hold-up problem has been largely studied in the economics literature, especially
on questions such as contract renegotiation whose prospect may induce one party
to underinvest in relationship-speciﬁc capital (see, for instance, Hart and Moore,
1988).4 This problem can also arise in case of termination of a relationship such
as between an employer and a worker, especially in cases of dismissal and resigna-
tion. Ruehmann and Suedekum (2003) question the eﬀect of severance payments on
ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital. Severance payments can increase workers’ incentives to
invest in such capital because, relying on a long-term duration of their job, workers
are willing to ﬁt the job as well as possible for their speciﬁc employer. But this can
also have an opposite eﬀect because, anticipating a severance payment when ﬁred,
the worker may perceive ﬁring as less costly and this may reduce his incentives to
invest in speciﬁc capital. The ﬁrst eﬀect joins the idea of Wasmer (2006) who high-
lights that high employment protection increases the probability that workers will
choose speciﬁc skills (in opposition with general ones), notably because in raising
the duration of jobs, it also raises the relative return to speciﬁc skills. Finally, Cahuc
and Zylberberg (2000) ﬁnd that in a framework where contracts are incomplete and
may be renegotiated, increases in severance payments have a negative eﬀect on wel-
fare. Given that some separations are eﬃcient, compulsory severance payments may
prevent the parties from separating, even though the separation may be eﬃcient in
some cases.
Linking diﬀerent strands of literature and adopting a positive view, we assert
the idea that the problem of underinvestment in speciﬁc skills may be solved through
the mere presence of the judicial system: the shadow of the judge’s intervention,
in case of disagreement on the severance payment, may induce parties in a work
relation to invest in relationship-speciﬁc capital despite the risk of termination of
that relation. Thus, our preoccupations are close to those of Belot et al. (2006) but
we do not consider employment protection as a whole but highlight the role of the
court’s possible intervention in a positive way. Moreover, in our model, both parties
(i.e., not only the worker) are assumed to be able to make speciﬁc investments.
Furthermore, our paper is an attempt to rehabilitate the judge in his functions. We
show that his intervention is necessary in terms of overall economic eﬃciency: the
4See MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) and Tirole (1999) for surveys of the literature on incom-
plete contracts, speciﬁc investments, and hold-up problem.
6fact that he takes an active part in judicial decisions (such as ﬁring decisions) by
considering economic criteria is desirable.
3 The Model
3.1 The Framework
We consider the relationship that exists between a ﬁrm f and its worker w. The
parties are contemplating undertaking (non-contractible) productivity-enhancing,
relationship-speciﬁc investments, which would increase the size of the aggregate
surplus (or proﬁt) that they can generate from their relationship. Before any in-
vestments are made, the ﬁrm and the worker produce one unit of output and the
worker’s wage agreement is w, where w ∈ (0,1). With this labor contract in place,
the two partners interact over two dates. At date 1, the ﬁrm and its employee simul-
taneously and non-cooperatively choose their respective investment levels If ≥ 0 and
Iw ≥ 0, which are sunk once they have been made. The cost to player i (i = f,w) of
investing Ii equals cIi, where c > 0 is his marginal cost of investment.5 If the ﬁrm
invests If and the worker invests Iw, then the output would increase by Π(If,Iw),
provided, of course, that the parties continue to work together. It is assumed that
Π(If,Iw) is increasing in each of its arguments, strictly concave, smooth and satisﬁes
the Inada endpoint conditions. However, it is possible that once the investments
have been undertaken and sunk, the parties cannot continue to work together. At
date 2, we assume that two states of nature may be realized:
1/ The ﬁrm may incur some economic diﬃculties for exogenous reasons which
oblige her to ﬁre the worker.6 This “bad” state of the world is assumed to happen
with probability q ∈ (0,1/2]. In that eventuality the ﬁrm and the employee try to
ﬁnd a compromise and bargain over the severance pay s that the employee will get.7
5For simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume that the ﬁrm and the worker have
an identical and constant marginal cost of investment. This assumption has been introduced for
algebraic convenience and could be relaxed without altering the gist of our arguments.
6An economic layoﬀ is a dismissal due to the non requirement of or a reduced need for certain
jobs resulting itself from an economic reason, such as economic diﬃculties, technological issues,
the necessity of preserving competitiveness of the company or the end of the activity/purpose of
the company.
7A compromise between a ﬁrm and a worker is a contract by which parties put an end to an
existing dispute or prevent themselves from a dispute arising. This type of contract is widely used
following up a layoﬀ. This concerns especially skilled workers who negotiate over their severance
payment under the threat of suing their employer for unfair dismissal if they cannot ﬁnd a compro-
mise: this practice is called “golden parachutes”, taking the form of bonus, severance pay, stock
7We adopt the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) to describe the outcome of these
negotiations, in which the parties’ payoﬀs from disagreement are identiﬁed with
the threat points in Nash’s bargaining solution.8 If the parties strike a negotiated
settlement on s, then the utility payoﬀs to the ﬁrm and the employee are respectively:
u
1
f = 1 + γΠ(If,Iw) − s and u
1
w = s
The ﬁrm gets the initial output (i.e., 1) plus some part of the surplus and
pays the severance payment s to the worker. The parameter γ ∈ [0,1) formalizes
the degree of speciﬁcity of investments and captures the fact that the investments
are more valuable inside the relation rather than with outside parties (γ = 0 is the
most extreme form of speciﬁcity, and γ → 1 corresponds to the least extreme form
of speciﬁcity). In this context, layoﬀ entails that only a fraction (and possibly none)
of the beneﬁts from the investments are obtainable (even if the parties are able to
reach a negotiated settlement over s). In case of bargaining impasse, we consider
that the labor conﬂict is resolved by litigation such that a judge is empowered to
impose a severance pay allowance sJ. The disagreement payoﬀs are as follows:
df = 1 + βΠ(If,Iw) − sJ and dw = sJ, where sJ = λw + αΠ(If,Iw) (1)
The parameter β ∈ [0,1) will be called the worker resentment factor and captures the
extent to which the employee refuses to cooperate with the ﬁrm (until his eﬀective
redundancy) in the event he goes to trial. Given that β < γ, it may be noted that the
disagreement point is Pareto-ineﬃcient, since the sum of the players’ disagreement
payoﬀs is strictly less than the aggregate surplus from an agreement (which is 1 +
γΠ(If,Iw)). Indeed, it seems reasonable to consider that the failure to reach a
negotiated settlement on their own and the fact that the conﬂict is resolved by a
judge entails some degree of ineﬃciency for the parties. The severance pay allowance
sJ imposed by the judge may be interpreted as follows. The ﬁrst term of sJ is a
lump-sum payment which does not depend upon the investment levels and increases
with the existing wage, while the second term is some fraction of the economic
surplus Π and increases with the investments made by the parties at date 1.9 In
options or a combination thereof. It can appear as a clause in the labor contract or be decided
when it ends.
8Muthoo (1999) discusses the strategic non-cooperative foundations of the Nash bargaining
solution and, using various versions of Rubinstein’s alternating-oﬀers model, shows why, when and
how to use this bargaining solution concept.
9We implicitly assume that the worker remains unemployed and does not receive employment
beneﬁts. This assumption allows us to focus attention on the factors that inﬂuence the determi-
nation of the judge’s optimal behavior, and thus allows us to develop in a clean way the impact of
8most countries, the employer is entitled to give the dismissed worker a severance pay
which is based upon a redundancy payment scale (indicating the minimum amount
the employee should receive). In real world, this scale takes into account several
elements such as the number of completed years of service, the age, the weekly or
hourly pay, or at least the minimum required under the national minimum wage
regulations. In our model, the redundancy payment scale is captured by the term
λw (where λ ∈ <+ is exogenously determined by the law) and is assumed to depend
only upon the existing wage (for simplicity). Furthermore, in reality, if a ﬁred worker
contests the dismissal, fails to reach a settlement with the employer, and goes to
trial, then the judge may impose a severance pay allowance which moves away from
this minimal amount prescribed by the law. In our model, the legal intervention is
captured by the second term αΠ(If,Iw), where α is decided by the judge.10
2/ If the “good” state of the world is realized, with probability (1 − q), we
assume that the ﬁrm does not incur economic diﬃculties. In that case, the parties
continue to work in “harmony” with the labor contract in place and all of the
beneﬁts from the investments are obtainable. The utility payoﬀs to the ﬁrm and the
employee are then as follows:
u
2
f = 1 + Π(If,Iw) − w and u
2
w = w (2)
There are diﬀerent core parameters in our model, which are central to the determi-
nation of the optimal judge’s decision (α): the technological parameters as captured
by the properties of the function Π(.), the degree of speciﬁcity of the parties’ invest-
ments (γ), the extent of non-cooperation by the employee when the parties fail to
reach an agreement on their own (β) and the industry shock probability (q). Our
main objective is to analyze and develop the role and impact of these parameters
on the optimal court’s behavior.
Before analyzing the main question of interest, we have to characterize the
unique subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) of our two-stage game using the back-
ward induction procedure. We therefore begin by determining the equilibrium bar-
gaining outcome at date 2, conditional on an arbitrary set of investments chosen at
such factors. Furthermore, given that such unemployment beneﬁts do not depend on the invest-
ments, this hypothesis could be relaxed without altering our results. This is because what drives
a party’s investment incentives are the marginal returns on investment, which are unaﬀected by
ﬁxed costs.
10Notice that, from a theoretical standpoint, the parameter α may take any positive or negative
value (i.e., α ∈ <). However, it seems reasonable to limit the feasible transfers between the ﬁrm
and the worker by considering that α ≥ 0 (i.e., worker’s limited liability constraint) and α ≤ β
(given that only a fraction β of the surplus is realized if the parties go to trial).
9date 1.
3.2 Bargaining Outcome
Let (If,Iw) denote an arbitrary pair of investments undertaken at date 1. Applying
the NBS in which the threat point is given by (1), it is easy to show that the
Nash-bargained utility payoﬀs to the ﬁrm and the worker are respectively:11
u
N










These expressions can be interpreted in the following way. The parties agree ﬁrst of
all to give player i (i = f,w) what he would obtain from not reaching an agreement,
and then they split the remaining surplus. In particular, the presence (and possible
intervention) of the court implies that the worker claims and gets the share sJ he
would obtain in case of disagreement. The remaining surplus is split in such a
way that the employer (worker) keeps a fraction (γ + β)/2 ((γ − β)/2) of it, and
the worker gets the remainder. Notice that the ﬁrm’s Nash-bargained share of the
remaining surplus is increasing in β, while the opposite is the case with regard to the
worker’s Nash-bargained share. Furthermore, the two players Nash-bargained shares
are increasing in γ. The intuition behind these observations is straightforward. If
the worker is not prone to resentment when he is constrained to go to court in order
to get an acceptable dismissal payment (i.e., when β is high), then the ﬁrm obtains
a large part of the realizable beneﬁts from the investments and, as such, the higher
are those beneﬁts (i.e., the higher is the value of β), the bigger is the diﬀerence
between the ﬁrm’s and the worker’s disagreement payoﬀs, which, in turn, implies
that the greater is the diﬀerence in the players’ bargaining powers. Furthermore,
the less extreme is the form of speciﬁcity (i.e., the higher is the value of γ), the less
each party is “held-up” by the other party and, then, the lower is the diﬀerence in
the players’ bargaining powers.
Recall that this bargaining stage occurs only if the industry shocks occurs
(with probability q), while the parties continue to work together in the other state
of nature (with probability (1−q)). It follows that the date 1 expected utility payoﬀs
to the ﬁrm and the worker are respectively:
uf = qu
N





w + (1 − q)u
2
w (6)
11Recall that the parties bargain over the severance pay only in the bad state of the world (that
is, when the employee is ﬁred).
10Hence, using (2), (3) and (4), after simplifying and re-arranging terms, it follows:
uf = 1 − [λq + (1 − q)]w + ΩfΠ(If,Iw) (7)
uw = [λq + (1 − q)]w + ΩwΠ(If,Iw) (8)
where Ωf = 1 − q














The player i’s (i = f,w) payoﬀ is a fraction Ωi ∈ (0,1) of the economic surplus
Π(If,Iw), which implies that Ωi deﬁnes i’s bargaining power. Notice that the party
i’s bargaining power depends on the judge’s behavior (captured by the parameter
α), the degree of investments’ speciﬁcity (formalized by γ), the worker resentment
factor (captured by β) and the industry shock probability (which is modelized by
q).
3.3 Equilibrium Investments
Having characterized the outcome of the date 2 negotiations over the partition of
the surplus (for an arbitrary set of decisions made at date 1), we now proceed in
the standard backward induction fashion and determine the equilibrium investment
levels chosen by the parties at date 1. However, we ﬁrst characterize the ﬁrst-best
(or Pareto-eﬃcient) investment levels. The ﬁrst-best levels of investments (Ie
f,Ie
w)
maximize the aggregate net surplus which is given by:
S (If,Iw) = 1 + (Ωf + Ωw)Π(If,Iw) − c(If + Iw) (10)
Thus, the ﬁrst-best investment levels Ie
f and Ie
w are the unique solutions to the
following ﬁrst-order conditions:
(Ωf + Ωw)Π1 (If,Iw) = c (11)
(Ωf + Ωw)Π2 (If,Iw) = c (12)
where Π1 (Π2) is the ﬁrst-order derivative with respect to If (Iw). The left-hand
sides in (11) and (12) are respectively the social marginal beneﬁts of the ﬁrm’s and
the worker’s investments, while the right-hand sides denote their respective private
(which are identical to the social) marginal costs.
The Nash equilibrium investment levels, denoted by I∗
f and I∗
w, are chosen to
maximize uf − cIf and uw − cIw respectively (where uf and uw are deﬁned in (7)
and (8)). Therefore, (I∗
f,I∗
w) comprise the unique solution to the following ﬁrst-order
conditions:
ΩfΠ1 (If,Iw) = c (13)
ΩwΠ2 (If,Iw) = c (14)
11The left-hand sides in (13) and (14) are respectively the private marginal beneﬁts of
the ﬁrm’s and the employee’s investments, while the right-hand sides denote their
respective marginal costs. Given that Ωi > 0 (∀i = f,w), the social marginal beneﬁt
from each party’s investment strictly exceeds its private marginal cost. It then
follows that the parties underinvest relative to their respective ﬁrst-best investment
levels.
Proposition 1. Whatever the judge’s behavior, the equilibrium investments are
strictly less than the corresponding ﬁrst-best investment levels.
This underinvestment result comes from the fact that neither party is able
to obtain - in the bargaining equilibrium - the full social marginal beneﬁt from
its investment. Ex-post bilateral monopoly plus bargaining yields each party to
be “held-up” after investments are sunk by the other party. Anticipating this op-
portunistic behavior from the other side, it is clear that each party will have less
incentives to invest. This hold-up problem arises in many other contexts (see, for
example, Hart, 1995) and it is precisely for this phenomenon that the presence of a
judge in the background of negotiations may have eﬃciency consequences. Indeed,
since I∗
f and I∗
w depend on the judge’s behavior (via the impact of this parameter
on each player’s bargaining power Ωi; i = f,w), it is clear that this behavior will be
crucial in determining the investment incentives. We now turn to address this main
issue.
3.4 The Judge’s Optimal Behavior
We analyze the issue of what entails the “judge’s optimal behavior”. The optimal α
is the one that maximizes the equilibrium aggregate net surplus (or social welfare)
S(I∗
f,I∗
w), where S(.,.) is deﬁned in (10). As mentioned above, the equilibrium
aggregate net surplus depends on the value of α indirectly, via its inﬂuence on
the equilibrium investment levels. We write it as S∗(α). So, the judge’s optimal
behavior, denoted by α∗, is the value of α that maximizes S∗(α) and thus provides
the partners with the best investment incentives. It is clear that the optimal α will
provide relatively higher equilibrium surplus, and relatively smaller distortions of
the equilibrium investment levels with regard to their ﬁrst-best levels. The following
result is useful in developing our subsequent analysis of the judge’s optimal behavior.
Lemma 1. For any α ∈ [0,1],
∂S∗(α)
∂α
T 0 ⇔ Π22(Ωw)
4 − Π11(Ωf)
4 T 0
12where Π11 and Π22 are evaluated at the equilibrium investment levels.
Proof. See Appendix A
Since this expression is still rather intricate, not much can be said about α∗
without imposing further restrictions on the function Π(.). Therefore, we consider
the widely used class of functions of the Cobb-Douglas type, namely Π(If,Iw) =
(If)µf(Iw)µw, where 0 < µi < 1 (i = f,w) and µf + µw < 1. These functions are
smooth, strictly increasing and strictly concave; the parameters µf and µw capture
the parties’ productivities. Our main objective is to analyze the impact of these
technological parameters and of the other parameters - mentioned above - on the
judge’s optimal role. Our main result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Assume that Π(If,Iw) = (If)µf(Iw)µw, where 0 < µi < 1 (i = f,w)










Proof. See Appendix B
While the hypothesis of this proposition restricts the class of applicable func-
tions Π, such a restriction has been deliberately chosen to enable us to develop our
main results and insights in a focused and tractable manner, and its implications
are powerful.
Corollary 1. The comparative productivities of the two partners for the generation
of the surplus are a key force determining the judge’s optimal behavior:
µf T µw (hence, τ T 1) ⇔ Ωf(α
∗) T Ωw(α
∗)
The intuition behind this follows from the fact that when party i’s investment
is more productive than j’s (i = f,w; j = f,w; i 6= j), then the optimal value α∗
translates into a greater bargaining strength of i compared to j, which it will use
to obtain a larger share of the economic surplus.12 In other words, if the worker’s
investment productivity is larger than the employer’s one (i.e., µw > µf), then the
12To see this, substitute the optimal value α∗ from Proposition 2 into (9) to obtain:
Ωf(α∗) = τ
1+τ [1 + q(γ − 1)] and Ωw(α∗) = 1
1+τ [1 + q(γ − 1)].
13“optimal judge” has to disadvantage the employer, such that the worker’s share
of the economic surplus Π generated from the two parties’ investments increases
(other things equal). This will cause the worker’s investment incentives to increase,
and the ﬁrm’s incentives to decrease, so that I∗
w > I∗
f. The opposite is true if
µw < µf. Following the same idea, if µw = µf, then the optimal value α∗ is the
unique value of α such that Ω∗
f = Ω∗
w. A judge adopting such a behavior ensures that
the parties’ payoﬀs from disagreement are equalized, that the bargaining powers are
“harmonized”, and that the economic surplus is split equally. This balancing out of
bargaining powers is central to the provision of appropriate investment incentives to
the two parties. Indeed, in such a context, the players cannot make strategic use of
their threat points in bargaining situations they encounter throughout their labor
relationships. Both parties are thus willing to invest optimally because the judge’s
presence protects each of them from expropriation by the other. This presence,
when implementing α∗, creates a particular game between the partners in which the
ability of individuals to engage in rent-seeking behavior is minimized. In summary,
the possible intervention of a judge in negotiations over the severance payment
may prevent the parties from behaving opportunistically ex-post, thereby promoting
eﬃcient second-best investments ex-ante.
However, the result stated in Proposition 2 says also that the judge, when
choosing α∗, has to take into account the industry shock probability (q), the worker
resentment factor (β) and the degree of investments’ speciﬁcity (γ). Conducting a









T 0 ⇔ µf S µw
We note ﬁrst that the optimal value of α is increasing in β. This implies
that the more the ﬁrm is able to capture the beneﬁts from the investments when
the parties fail to reach an agreement (i.e., the higher is the value of β), the larger
should be the share of the economic surplus given by the judge to the employee. This
relationship is consistent with the idea that a key force underlying the determination
of the optimal behavior adopted by the judge concerns the tendency to equalize
players’ bargaining powers. In other words, an increase in β, which increases the
employer’s (original) bargaining power in his labor relationships, should be partially
oﬀset by an increase in α. In this perspective, giving a larger share of Π to the
worker whose the (original) bargaining power is relatively lower than the employer’s
one is consistent with the aim of endowing the worker with greater bargaining power
and thus inducing him to provide the optimal level of investment. Indeed, the
14party i’s (i = f,w) relative bargaining power determines i’s marginal returns on its
investment, which, in turn, determines its marginal incentives.
The inﬂuence of q on the optimal value of α may be interpreted in a similar
way. The ﬁrm has relatively better investment incentives in the case where it does
not incur economic diﬃculties (which is more likely when q is low), precisely because
layoﬀ implies that only a fraction of the returns from the investments are obtainable,
even if the parties reach a negotiated settlement over the severance payment. Fur-
thermore, the bargaining situation which occurs when the “bad” state of the world
is realized (which is more likely when q is high) gives the worker the opportunity to
explicitly hold-up the ﬁrm (where the degree to which he can do so is captured by
the magnitude of the parameter β). On the contrary, such an opportunistic behavior
is not possible in the “good” state of the world, where the employer appropriates
all the beneﬁts from his investment (since the partners continue to work together
with the existing contract in place). Therefore, an increase in q, which decreases the
ﬁrm’s incentives to invest, should be oﬀset by a decrease in the share α provided by
the judge to the employee.
Finally, the link between α and the degree of investments’ speciﬁcity γ is
straightforward. The intuition underlying this relationship is the following one.
The less speciﬁc are the investments (i.e, the higher is the value of γ), the more the
employer is able to capture the returns from the investments when he is constrained
to ﬁre the worker. This in turn creates less incentives for this latter to invest and
entails some degree of ineﬃciency, especially when his investment is relatively more
important (i.e., µw > µf). Under these conditions, the judge should compensate
this perverse eﬀect by harmonizing the parties’ respective bargaining powers, restore
the appropriate incentives to invest, and, for that, increase the employee’s share of
the economic surplus.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper studies the impact of the judge’s decision on the incentives to invest of
two parties (an employer and a worker) embedded in a labor relationship. The aim
of our analysis is twofold. First, it is to determine which role should be given to
the judge in the settlement of labor disputes. The second question refers to how
the judge should make his decision, that is, how much he should make one party
prevailing over the other one in his judgment in order to provide both parties with
the optimal incentives to invest. We show that the mere presence of the judge
allows to give the right incentives to the parties. Indeed, his ex-post decision and its
15determinants are not neutral ex-ante on the investments allowing to create a surplus:
not only the presence of the judge but also his behavior are crucial in determining
the overall eﬃciency of investments in human and physical capital. In a more general
way, this paper answers to a currently important question: what should the judge
take into account when making a decision related to a labor conﬂict? We highlight
that the optimal share of the surplus the worker should receive ex-post depends on
four crucial parameters: the industry shock probability (q), the worker’s resentment
factor in case of disagreement (β), the degree of investments’ speciﬁcity (γ) and the
investments’ productivities (µf and µw).
A major interest of our analysis would be to compare diﬀerent judicial systems,
which could be possible by considering the deﬁnition of these parameters from an
aggregated standpoint. For example, let us conjecture and interpret the industry
shock probability as representing the economic conjuncture in a given geographic
area. Our model says that the worse this conjuncture is, the more the employer
should be advantaged by the judge in case of labor conﬂict (i.e., the smaller the
share of the surplus the worker should receive). In the same way, the worker’s
resentment factor captures the ability of the worker to decrease the surplus in case
of disagreement and may represent, for example, the occurrence of a strike. From a
macroeconomic point of view, evaluating the right of strike of the labor force (which
may be formalized by the magnitude of β) would allow to infer recommendations
regarding the optimal division of the surplus by the judge.
In this sense, this paper is in line with the empirical studies showing that
the judges would be inﬂuenced by economic conditions when deciding over a labor
conﬂict (Ichino et al., 2003; Marinescu, 2005). Our analysis provides some theo-
retical (and normative) foundations to the empirical results of these studies, and
contributes to the current works and/or recommendations about the place of the
judiciary in labor relationships. In a sense, our analysis is also in accordance with
some measures proposed by Blanchard and Tirole (2003, 2004), who recommend the
ﬁrms to be ﬁnancially responsible for their layoﬀs, the cost of which depending op-
timally, among other elements, upon their layoﬀ rate. The diﬀerence is that, in our
model, this contribution is made possible thanks to the existence of the judiciary,
whereas these authors plead for an important limitation of the judge’s role. The
economic consequence of both analyses is to make ﬁrms liable of their layoﬀs, but
in one case this is made possible by limiting the role of the judiciary, while in the
other case it becomes possible precisely through the existence of the judiciary.
The question of who should implement the optimal severance pay allowance is
also interesting. In fact, we implicitly assume in our theoretical framework that the
16parameter α is decided by the judge and λ by the law, but one can also consider
that both parameters appearing in the severance pay allowance may be decided
by the legislator himself. For example, the values of α and λ could be mentioned
in codes (such as the French labor civil code). In this context, the judge would
be entitled to enforce these values and could not individually decide of the way to
divide the surplus. In this case, he would have no discretionary power. However,
this possibility does not challenge our analysis, in the sense that the question of the
existence and design of an eﬃcient judiciary remains relevant (eﬃcient in that it
allows to provide the parties with the best investment incentives). In either case,
the presence of the judiciary and the judge is essential. Then, one way to determine
in which extent the judge should be partially independent would be to analyze who
(the judge or the legislator, for instance) can observe the most easily the parameters
inducing the optimal share of the surplus given to the employee (i.e., q, β, γ, µf
and µw). The available information for the court to make the optimal decision
must also be discussed. In the paper, we have assumed that these parameters are
common knowledge and, then observable by the judge. Although counter-intuitive
at ﬁrst, one can argue that this assumption is realistic and empirically relevant.
Indeed, it is consistent with the practice of justice in Civil Law countries as well as
in Common Law ones.13 Legal procedures generally imply that the parties’ private
information is conveyed to each other and to the judge (Froeb and Kobayashi, 2001).
Of course, strategic behaviors are possible and the literature on conﬂicts’ resolution
insists on the importance of informational asymmetries to explain the “bargaining
in the shadow of the law”(Bebchuk, 1984; Cooter and Rubinfeld, 1989; Kennan
and Wilson, 1993). However, it is also shown that at the time the judge makes his
decision, he has collected the relevant information concerning the case he has to
solve.
Furthermore, we do not consider here possible “insolvency” problems by as-
suming that the ﬁrm is always able to pay the severance pay allowance to the worker.
While this might seem inconsistent with the occurrence of a redundancy (due to eco-
nomic diﬃculties), we may consider that laying-oﬀ one (or several) worker(s) will
allow the ﬁrm to get back some assets (or at least to allege its liabilities), making
it able to pay damages to the laid-oﬀ worker(s). Moreover, following footnote 9 (p.
9), this assumption may also be justiﬁed through the fact that some part of the
severance pay allowance is a share of the surplus generated by the relation, which
13Even if procedures are quite diﬀerent in the two systems (i.e., inquisitorial versus accusatory),
the court is provided with all relevant information at the time of its decision. Under an inquisitorial
system, the judge plays an active role to collect information, whereas under the accusatory one,
he receives the information collected by the parties.
17means that the surplus makes this allowance in part possible. Furthermore, the
occurrence of such a problem is often limited by law. For example, in French law,
the employees are among the “privileged creditors”of a ﬁrm, which means that they
are among the ﬁrst creditors to be paid in case of insolvency. Nevertheless, it might
be interesting to extend this model by introducing the possibility for a ﬁrm to go
bankrupt and to see how this would modify the investment incentives of the parties
and the behavior adopted by the judge.
Another possible extension to our model would consist to consider an endoge-
nous layoﬀ decision by the employer. In the paper, we assume that the occurrence
of the industry shock is systematically followed by the worker’s dismissal. It would
be relevant to extend our analysis by considering the separation decision of the ﬁrm
in order to study, in particular, the impact of the judge’s behavior on the ex-ante
employer’s layoﬀ decision.
18Annexe A. Proof of Lemma 1
















w are deﬁned by the ﬁrst-order conditions in (13) and (14).
Diﬀerentiating S∗ with respect to α, we obtain:
∂S∗(α)
∂α






















Furthermore, by totally diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst-order conditions in (13) and (14)





























where ∆ = Π11Π22 −(Π12)
2, with all the ﬁrst-order and second-order partial deriva-
tives evaluated at the equilibrium investment levels. The strict concavity of Π
implies that ∆ > 0 and the Young’s theorem states that Π21 = Π12 for all pairs
(If,Iw).
After substituting for the derivatives of the equilibrium investments (stated in (A.2)
into the right-hand side of (A.1), using the ﬁrst-order conditions in (13) and (14) to










The Lemma follows immediately since c > 0, q ≥ 0, ∆ > 0 and Ωi > 0 (∀i = f,w).

Annexe B. Proof of Proposition 2
From the ﬁrst-order conditions in (13) and (14), we obtain the following relationship





















19After substituting for the equilibrium values of Π11 and Π22, by using (B.1) and
replacing Ωf and Ωw by their values in (9), it follows that:
∂S∗(α)
∂α
T 0 ⇔ α
∗ S
2(1 − q) + q[β(1 + τ) + γ(1 − τ)]
2q(1 + τ)
Hence, given the strict concavity of S(.), we have established that the stationary
point α = α∗ is the point at which S∗ achieves its maximum. 
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